In this paper, I offer two ways in which firms can collude: secret monitoring and infrequent coordination. Such collusion is enforceable with intuitive communication protocols. I make my case in the context of a repeated Cournot oligopoly with flexible production, prices that follow a Brownian motion and no monetary side payments, an environment where it has previously been argued that any collusion is impossible. Trade associations can easily facilitate collusion by mediating communication amongst firms.
Mediated strategies (Forges, 1986; Myerson, 1986) can be thought of as a plausible generalization of private strategies (i.e., strategies that depend on private histories). Mailath et al. (2002) argued that private strategies help to correlate behavior. Mediated strategies allow for arbitrary correlation. More generally, mediated strategies offer a useful benchmark where firms enjoy unlimited communication possibilities. Although antitrust law forbids communication among oligopolists (Stigler, 1964) , it is a fact of economic life (e.g., Genesove and Mullin, 2001; Marshall and Marx, 2012) , so understanding collusion requires seeing how communication facilitates it. This motivates the model of mediated collusion in oligopolistic markets below.
In the model, prices follow a Brownian motion and firms can vary their production with arbitrary frequency, for two reasons. First, as Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2010, p. 871) argued, abstracting from the friction of a fixed period length "uncover [s] fundamental principles of [. . .] repeated interactions." This abstraction disciplines significantly how information can be reliably aggregated.
3 Second, to underscore the value of communication, impossibility results of Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2007, 2010) are overturned simply and intuitively. Restricting attention to public strategies, they showed that no collusion was possible with flexible production. Contrariwise, I offer below two ways of sustaining virtually full collusion for sufficiently patient firms.
4
Mediating collusion can be simple and intuitive. Consider an agreement with two regimes. In the collusive regime, firms take turns monopolizing the market. When one firm is the monopolist the others shut down and overall terms of the relationship remain unchanged. For firms to shut down willingly, occasionally the relationship enters its monitoring regime. The monopolist "monitors" the other firms by secretly producing at capacity, 5 and the terms of their agreement are updated as follows. If 3 Rahman (2013b) makes this point in a simpler context. It shows that the aggregation approach of Abreu et al. (1991) , for instance, fails with frequent actions. Moreover, a version of Kandori and Matsushima's (1998) approach yields limited success, generally bounded away from full collusion. 4 Although the idea that communication can generally facilitate collusion is not new (e.g., Compte, 1998; Kandori and Matsushima, 1998; Kandori, 2003; Aoyagi, 2005; Obara, 2009; Tomala, 2009) , this literature has failed to address frequent actions or repeated Cournot oligopoly with imperfect public monitoring. With privately (and conditionally independently) observed sales, Harrington and Skrzypacz (2011) offer a discrete-time model of collusion with communication and money transfers. This is problematic inasmuch as monetary transfers are easier to detect than cheap talk, since detection may carry large legal risks. Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2007) also argued that collusion may be possible with money transfers in their model, but conjectured (p. 1814) that collusion would be impossible without money, even in private strategies. In this paper, firms sustain collusion by trading continuation values (e.g., how often each monopolizes the market), not money. 5 A capacity constraint is not essential for this agreement to be an equilibrium, as I show below.
prices turn out to be low, the firms that had ostensibly shut down pay the monopolist in continuation value, whereas if prices are high the monopolist pays them. Every firm is willing to abide by this collusive agreement, regardless of production flexibility. Indeed, a firm at capacity gains from low prices but cannot lower them any more, whereas a firm shutting down gains from high prices but cannot raise them further, so neither wishes to deviate. 6 This suggests a new interpretation of price warsperiods where some firms flood the market and seem to temporarily shut down the competition-as rounds of monitoring.
The role of mediation in this agreement is to facilitate secret monitoring. Monitoring is costly, as it incurs the opportunity cost of foregone monopoly rents. To economize on monitoring, the mediator shifts regimes secretly. Now firms are willing to concede their market to a monopolist because of the mere possibility of being monitored, even if often they are not actually monitored. In contrast, Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2007) restrict attention to public equilibria, which prevents a monitoring regime from being secret. Therefore, their firms cannot economize on monitoring costs by monitoring only seldom, hence their impossibility result.
The mediator is dispensable in the construction above, although it does simplify the analysis. Below I show how firms can replace the mediator by secretly choosing and subsequently announcing the monitoring regime themselves, and conditioning future behavior on those choices. The added complication that arises is that now firms must be willing to report the true regime they choose, but this just requires that firms obtain the same value from both regimes.
Another way of sustaining collusion is with infrequent coordination, as I show in the online appendix. First, firms agree on a coordination frequency, say quarterly. Throughout each quarter, firms usually share the market evenly by producing their share of monopoly output. Occasionally, firms vary their output. Each firm is secretly evaluated relative to others' behavior and realized prices throughout the quarter. A firm whose evaluation is unsatisfactory is punished with the loss of continuation value in the game. The evaluation is kept secret by conditioning it on others' secret behavior. This way, no firm is ever certain that it will avoid punishment. As a result, the threat of punishment always provides incentives for cooperation. Therefore, sufficiently patient firms can sustain virtually full collusion.
Secret Monitoring
Following Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2007) , two firms play repeated Cournot oligopoly. Each firm i produces q it ∈ [0, q] units of a costless homogeneous good in period t, for some exogenous capacity constraint q ≥ 0. The market price is p t , where
P is continuously differentiable, P (0) > 0 and P (q) < 0 for all q,
is a random shock, σ 2 is a variance parameter, and ∆t is the length of time between observations. Firms share a common discount factor δ = e −r∆t < 1. Let q m denote monopoly output, P (q) = p and Π(q) = Pr(p > p|q) = Φ(
) the probability that a price exceeds p if total output is q, where Φ is the standard normal CDF. Theorem 1. For every ε > 0 there exists (r, ∆) 0 such that given (r, ∆t) ≤ (r, ∆), a mediated equilibrium exists whose industry profits are within ε of monopoly rents.
Let me sketch a proof below, and relegate all details to the appendix. Consider the following mediated strategy. Fix µ > 0 small. With probability 1 2 , a mediator selects one of the firms. If firm i was selected then the mediator asks firm j = i to produce 0 units of output. With conditional probability 1−µ, the mediator secretly recommends to firm i that it produce q m , and with conditional probability µ he recommends q.
Let v and w be given. Once firms produce and the market price realizes, the mediator publicly announces previous recommendations and promises each firm a constant continuation value v, except for this contingency: If the mediator asked firm i to produce at capacity and p > p then firm j = i receives 1 2 w > 0 in continuation value from i over and above v, whereas if p ≤ p then j pays Figure 1: Recommendation probabilities (left) and recommendation-contingent transfers of continuation value depending on whether prices p exceed p (right).
7 P (0) > 0 justifies production. P (q) < 0 renders detectable infinitesimal deviations from q.
In contrast with Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2007) , continuation values depend on both prices and the mediator's recommendations: they vary by ± 1 2 w only in a monitoring regime. I show later how this motivates firms to shut down, monopolize the market and produce at capacity. If firms are patient, w can also be made so small that continuation values are themselves equilibrium payoffs, as I argue next. Let ε > 0 be small. Denote equilibrium industry rents by 2u = q m P (q m ) − ε and industry profits from the mediated strategy above by 2R = (1−µ)q m P (q m )+µqP (q), with µ > 0 small enough that R > u. Choose v, each firm's expected continuation value, to solve the decomposition u = (1 − δ)R + δv. In words, a firm's average lifetime payoff u is decomposed into current profit R and expected lifetime payoff v from next period on, discounted by δ. Let W be a smooth subset of payoff profiles as in Figure 3 . In the appendix I argue that every payoff profile in W can be enforced with continuation values in W . By Fudenberg et al. (1994, Theorem 4 .1), W is a subset of equilibrium payoffs for sufficiently patient firms. To convey the heart of the argument, I now show how (u, u) (u, u) . Since w is proportional to r and ∂W to √ r, there exists r > 0 close enough to 0 that w is arbitrarily small relative to ∂W . Therefore, the continuation values belong to the interior of W for all small enough r > 0. Furthermore, since w and ∂W are both proportional to √ ∆t, continuation values remain in the interior of W as ∆t → 0. See Figure 3 .
Next, let us verify that the collusive agreement is enforceable. A firm asked to produce q m is willing to do so, since its continuation value is the same regardless and monopoly output is optimal. A firm asked to produce q cannot expand production. If it restricts supply by h ∈ (0, q], current expected gains must be outweighed by future losses:
Similarly, a firm asked to shut down must profit relative to producing any h ∈ (0, q]:
It remains to show that w proportional to r √ ∆t can discourage these deviations.
Lemma 1. For every (r, ∆) ≥ 0 there exists a constant C < ∞ such that w ≥ Cr √ ∆t implies both (1) and (2) whenever (r, ∆t) ≤ (r, ∆). Proof. First, let us estimate (1). Since P is strictly decreasing, P (q − h) > p. Divide both sides of (1) by P (q − h) − p to obtain the equivalent inequality
Clearly,
Fix any ∆ > 0 and let c = c(∆). Again, by concavity of Π(q − h), it follows that c(∆t)/ √ ∆t ≥ c/ √ ∆ for all ∆t ≤ ∆. The left-hand side of (3) is bounded above by
Now let us estimate (2). Dividing both sides of (2) by p − P (q + h) > 0 yields
The left-hand side of this inequality is bounded above by (1 − δ)P (q m )/λ, where (1) and (2). Finally, since δ = e −r∆ ≤ e −r∆t = δ, if C = C * /(δµ) then w ≥ Cr √ ∆t implies (1) and (2).
Firms can dispense with the mediator by announcing their intentions with delay. For simplicity, let firms take turns monopolizing the market with a public randomization device. 9 Every period, the ostensibly producing firm secretly records its intended output before producing and publicly reveals it after the price realizes. Whereas a mediator imposes the regime on firms, now it is the firms themselves who determine it, for which they require incentives. Therefore, let us shift
Since punishments and rewards are shifted by the same amount, incentive constraints at each regime coincide with (1) and (2) under v ± α . To rationalize mixed regimes, let α solve for indifference between the q m and q regimes:
and α/δ is proportional to r∆t in a neighborhood of 0. Therefore, the shifted continuation values eventually lie inside W as r∆t → 0. Thus, even though the same amount of collusion may not be attainable without a mediator at a given (r, ∆), it is for some (r, ∆t) ≤ (r, ∆). This construction applies to repeated games more generally. See Rahman (2012) for further discussion.
The equilibria above do not rely on capacity constraints. Rather, for any deviation profile from which an innocent firm cannot be identified, the sum of deviation gains must not be positive (Rahman and Obara, 2010, Theorem 4i). Intuitively, firms transfer value directly to each other, so a firm's incentives are the exact opposite of those for the other. Adding costs to a firm's deviation adds profit to the other's statistically identical one. Hence, if the sum of gains from identical deviations is positive then for any such transfer scheme some firm must profit by deviating.
Specifically to the agreement above, a firm asked to produce some q must not profit from producing more. That is, increasing supply beyond q by h > 0 must satisfy
Since firms' incentives oppose each other, plugging (2) into (4) and rearranging yields
This is necessary and sufficient for collusion as above without capacity constraints. An easily verifiable sufficient condition is if P is concave and there exists q such that P (q m ) ≤ −µMR(q), where MR stands for marginal revenue. This holds, for instance, when P is linear and negative prices are interpreted net of some average costs.
Conclusion
Firms attempting to collude can benefit substantially from arguably modest amounts of communication, especially with the help of a trade association. The collusive agreements above suggest occasional secret monitoring, deliberate over-or underproduction and price wars in otherwise stable relationships as behavioral traits that may interest regulators. Bernheim and Madsen (2013) report various episodes of apparent cheating without punishment-seemingly contradicting standard models of collusion-and suggest that firms may be too impatient to prevent cheating. I submit that these episodes are not just tolerable, but possibly essential for collusion-even if firms are patient. This behavior is ruled out by most of the relevant literature.
Thus, Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2007) show how collusion breaks down in public Nash equilibrium because value-burning is exorbitant: obedient firms cannot be identified, so discouraging overproduction requires punishing everyone whenever prices are low. By Lemma 1, this punishment cost is of order r √ ∆t, but the benefit, in terms of current collusion, is of order r∆t. As ∆t → 0, the costs overwhelm any benefits. With secret monitoring, I argued that firms can avoid value-burning altogether and collude in public communication equilibrium as long as (5) above holds. If (5) fails, though, the agreement falls apart and value-burning is unavoidable even in communication equilibrium. Nevertheless, firms may still be able to bound the costs of burning value and collude in private communication equilibrium, as I show in the online appendix. Intuitively, firms coordinate infrequently: they agree that it takes more than one low price to trigger punishment, which clearly economizes on punishment costs. Just which low prices trigger punishment is kept secret to recycle incentives.
To see how, fix a block of calendar time. In every period of this block, the mediator secretly recommends an output level to each firm, say IID across periods. He also constructs a latent score for each firm that follows a random walk whose drift depends on both realized prices and his secret recommendations. At the end of the block, if a firm's score exceeds a given threshold then it is punished by losing a given amount of continuation value; otherwise its continuation value remains the same. The score is constructed so that its drift equals zero in equilibrium, but any deviation raises the drift. This way, firms learn nothing about their score while they follow the mediator's recommendations, so they are never confident of eluding punishment, and every deviation raises the probability of punishment significantly relative to any deviation gains. As a result, the threat of such punishment always looms-so much so that it discourages firms from deviating. Hence, collusion prevails. 
Proof of Theorem 1
Let U = conv{(q 1 , q 2 )P (q 1 + q 2 ) : q i ∈ [0, q]} be the set of feasible (expected) payoffs. Let M be the set of correlated strategies 10 with finite support. For any such µ ∈ M, let R(µ) be the vector of expected payoffs associated with µ, that is,
q n P (q n )) be a suboptimal, symmetric static Nash equilibrium payoff profile, U + = {u ∈ U : u ≥ u + } denote the set of feasible payoffs that weakly exceed u + and U To prove Theorem 1, first I show that given ∆ > 0 there exists r > 0 such that W is a subset of equilibrium payoffs for every discount rate r < r. Next, I show that this is also true for all ∆t < ∆ at the same fixed discount rate r.
Step 1: W is Self-Decomposable
For the first step, I apply Theorem 4.1 of Fudenberg et al. (1994) , which argues that decomposability on tangent hyperplanes is sufficient. Before recalling this notion of decomposability I need a few preliminaries. Let Ω = {ω, ω m , ω 0 , ω}, where ω corresponds to the event p ≤ p, ω m to p < p ≤ p m = P (q m ), ω 0 to p m < p ≤ p 0 = P (0) and ω to p > p 0 . Although I could construct equilibria that extract more information from market prices, this additional information is unnecessary for my results.
Say that µ ∈ M is enforceable with respect to W and δ if there exists a vector u and a function v :
The first family of equations above describes value recursion. The second family describes incentive compatibility: discouraging recommendation-contingent deviations.
10 A correlated strategy is a probability measure on [0, q] × [0, q]. 11 Smooth means (i) closed and convex, (ii) with nonempty interior, and (iii) with a boundary that is a C 2 -submanifold (Fudenberg et al., 1994, Definition 4.3) .
Following Fudenberg et al. (1994) , if µ is enforceable with respect to W and δ with the pair (u, v), we will say that v enforces µ with respect to u and δ, and that u is decomposable with respect to µ, W and δ. If µ is enforceable with respect to some W and δ, it is simply called enforceable. Let B(W, r, ∆t) be the set of all payoff vectors that are decomposable as we vary µ with respect to fixed W , r and ∆t. If W ⊂ B(W, r, ∆t) for some r, we say that W is self-decomposable.
be the sets of partial histories of recommendations by the mediator and relevant price information. A public mediated strategy consists of a functionμ : H 0 → M that describes how the mediator makes private recommendations after every history and a commitment to publicly announce all previous recommendations at the beginning of every period. Thus, after partial history
, the mediator publicly announces h t 0 and then privately recommends q it to firm i and q jt to firm j with probabilityμ(q it , q jt |h t 0 ). The value ofμ is given by the vector of present-value payoffs
Given a public history h t 0 , I will also write
for the value ofμ conditional on h t 0 .
Definition 1. A public communication equilibrium, or simply equilibrium, is a public mediated strategyμ such that every one-step deviation is unprofitable:
Let E(r, ∆t) be the set of such equilibrium payoff vectors with parameters (r, ∆t).
By the principle of optimality, even if a firm considered dynamic deviations that depended on previous private information, that is, previous deviations, these would still be suboptimal by telescoping the sum of one-step deviation gains from each actual deviation, since each of these would be non-positive (and because payoffs are continuous at infinity). Therefore, a public communication equilibrium is an equilibrium in the traditional sense of the word. This, of course, is a standard argument.
Definition 2 (Fudenberg et al., 1994, Definition 4.4) . A smooth subset W ⊂ U + is decomposable on tangent hyperplanes if for every point u on the boundary of W there exists a correlated strategy µ with finite support such that (i) R(µ) is separated from W by the (unique) hyperplane P u that is tangent to W at u, and (ii) there exists a continuation payoff function v : [0, q] × [0, q] × Ω → P u that enforces µ.
I will now argue decomposability on tangent hyperplanes, for the following reason.
Lemma 2 (Fudenberg et al., 1994, Theorem 4.1) . If a smooth set W ⊂ U + is decomposable on tangent hyperplanes then r > 0 exists with W ⊂ E(r, ∆t) for all r < r.
Let W be a smooth subset of U
• + and let u belong to the boundary of W . Let λ be the outward unit normal vector to W at u. To obtain decomposability on tangent hyperplanes, I must show that for every λ there exists µ ∈ M such that (i)
, and (ii) there exist continuation values v that enforce µ with i λ i v i (q 1 , q 2 , ω) = 0 for all (q 1 , q 2 , ω). I study separately each kind of vector λ. Case 1: λ ≤ 0. Let µ be a static Nash equilibrium dominated by W , which is automatically enforceable with ex post budget balance because incentive compatibility holds without transfers. (This decomposition also applies to u in the interior of W .)
Case 2: λ i > 0, λ j = 0. Let µ be the correlated strategy where i monopolizes the market, that is, i produces q m and everyone else produces 0. In this case, firm i needs no incentives, so v i ≡ 0 satisfies incentive compatibility for i. As for j = i, j's payments do not enter the budget constraint because their weight is zero, so it suffices to show that µ is enforceable. I will show that for some v j > 0,
where
Following the proof of Lemma 1, dividing (6) by p m − P (q m + h) > 0 gives
Just as in Lemma 1, Π m is convex in P (q m + h) for h > 0, so
Let c m = c m (∆), where ∆ is the same as in Lemma 1. Since Π m is convex, it follows that
for all q, it follows that C m < ∞, and δv j ≥ C m r √ ∆t implies (6) for all ∆t ≤ ∆. Therefore, µ is enforceable, as required.
Case 3: λ i > 0, λ j > 0. Let µ be the correlated strategy of Figure 1 , and let continuation values be given by ± 1 2 w/λ i for each firm i, otherwise following the contingency rules of Figure 1 . For µ > 0 sufficiently small, R i (µ) exceeds u i and, as long as δwµ ≥ Cr √ ∆t, by Lemma 1 it follows that µ is enforceable, since λ i < 1.
Case 4: λ i > 0, λ j < 0. Consider the following correlated strategy µ:
Let µ 0 + µ 1 + µ 2 = 1 and every entry in the table above be strictly positive. For every u, there exists µ as above such that i λ i u i < i λ i R i (µ). In fact, it is easy to find µ such that λ i u i < λ i R i (µ) for each i. Indeed, notice that every point in U + is a convex combination of (0, q m P (q m )), (q m P (q m ), 0) and (0, 0). Moreover, each of these three points can be approximated arbitrarily closely with a correlated strategy as above, so any strictly positive convex combination of these three points lies inside the convex hull of some arbitrarily close approximation of them. Finally, since u belongs to the interior of U + , there is an open ball O ⊂ U • + that contains u. Consider the hyperplane with direction λ that goes through u. There clearly must exist a point in O on each side of this hyperplane. Let R be the point that also lies outside of W . Since R belongs to the interior of U + there exists a correlated strategy µ as above that attains the payoff profile R.
It remains to show that there exist continuation values v that enforce µ and also satisfy i λ i v i (q 1 , q 2 , ω) = 0 for all (q 1 , q 2 , ω). For this it will be enough to give players incentives only when (0, 0) was recommended: I will argue that there exists penalties v 1 , v 2 > 0 such that λ i v i + λ j v j = 0 and
Following the proof of Lemma 1, dividing (8) by p 0 − P (h) > 0 gives
As usual, Π 0 is convex in P (h) for h > 0, so the right-hand side is bounded below by
Let c 0 = c 0 (∆). Since Π 0 is convex, it follows that c 0 (∆t)/ √ ∆t ≥ c 0 / √ ∆ for all ∆t ≤ ∆. By (9), since 1 − δ ≤ r∆t and P (q) < p 0 for all q > 0, (8) is implied by
with budget balance, as required.
This concludes the first step of the proof of Theorem 1. That is, we have established that W is decomposable on tangent hyperplanes, so by Lemma 2, for every ∆t > 0 there exists r > 0 such that W ⊂ E(r, ∆t) whenever r ∈ (0, r]. Lemma 2 does not require enforcing profiles in the interior of W with continuation values in W . This in any case is easily obtained as in Fudenberg et al. (1994) by using a static Nash equilibrium to decompose interior points of W , as mentioned in Case 1 above.
Step 2: W Remains Self-Decomposable as ∆t → 0 It remains to prove that if this holds at (r, ∆) then it is still true for all ∆t < ∆. But this follows from the previous construction of continuation values. Fix r and ∆ such that W ⊂ E(r, ∆). Pick any u on the boundary of W , let µ be a correlated strategy as in the derivations above with expected payoff profile R(µ) and v be the associated vector of continuation values that decompose u with respect to its tangent hyperplane P u . I will first change variables as in Fudenberg et al. (1994) and then apply the incentive inequalities as a function of √ ∆t derived previously to find r ≤ r such that W ⊂ E(r, ∆t) for all ∆t ≤ ∆. By Lemma 2, it suffices to show that W is locally self-decomposable at u with respect to (r, ∆t) if it is so with respect to (r, ∆). That v enforces µ follows by Lemma 1 and its related inequalities in the proof of the first step. To see that (x 0 , v) belongs to the interior of W for small r > 0, first notice that r∆t < (1 − e −r∆t )/e −r∆t , and secondly, assume with loss that r > 0 is small enough to satisfy (1 − e −r∆ )/e −r∆ < 4r∆. These two inequalities imply that
1 − e −r∆t e −r∆t < c
Therefore, (x 0 , v) belongs to the interior of W for all ∆t < ∆.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 1.
Infrequent Coordination
According to Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2007) , collusion breaks down in public Nash equilibrium. Here, though, firms collude in public communication equilibrium as long as (5) above holds. If (5) fails, this agreement falls apart for the same reason as in Sannikov and Skrzypacz's result: obedient firms cannot be identified, so discouraging overproduction requires punishing everyone whenever prices are low. By Lemma 1, this punishment cost is of order r √ ∆t, but the benefit, in terms of current collusion, is of order r∆t. As ∆t → 0, the costs overwhelm any benefits. Nevertheless, firms can still collude in private communication equilibrium even if (5) fails, as I show next. Intuitively, firms coordinate infrequently: they agree that it takes more than one low price to trigger punishment, thus tempering punishment costs. Just which low prices trigger punishment is temporarily kept secret from firms to recycle incentives.
For simplicity, P (q) = q −e with 0 < e < 1 and firms face a constant marginal cost of γ > 0, 12 although the equilibrium construction clearly extends beyond this case. I also simplify the previous process to a random walk: firms observe the stock of prices, p t , whose innovations ∆p t =p t −p t−∆t equal σ √ ∆t (resp. −σ √ ∆t) with probability Π(q t ) = 1 2
). This change is innocuous, since both processes tolerate the equilibrium below, but helps to distill the argument.
13
Fix a block of calendar time c > 0. In every period of this block, the mediator fulfills two functions. As before, he secretly recommends an output profile to each firm, IID across periods, to be publicly revealed at the end of the block. He also constructs a latent score S i = {S it } for each firm i. S i follows a random walk whose drift depends on both realized prices and his secret recommendations. At the end of the block, if S ic exceeds a given threshold zc (linear in c) then firm i is punished by losing a given amount of continuation value w; otherwise its continuation value remains the same. The score is constructed so that its drift equals zero in equilibrium, but any deviation raises the drift. This way, firms learn nothing about their score while they follow the mediator's recommendations, so they are never confident of eluding punishment. By construction, every deviation raises the probability of such punishment significantly relative to any deviation gains. As a result, the threat of punishment always loomsso much so that it discourages firms from deviating altogether.
12 I only introduce these marginal costs so that the static Cournot outcome is easily well defined. 13 The process above is a random walk representation of-hence converges as ∆t → 0 to-the previous model's process for the stock of prices. This limit process is a Brownian motion with law dp t = P (q 1t + q 2t )dt + σdZ t , where Z stands for Wiener process. Moreover, being binomial, the random walk above withstands Fudenberg and Levine's (2007; 2009) hemi-continuity concerns.
Overview of the Literature on Block Strategies
Block strategies of some sort or another have been pointed out in the literature, but all previous attempts to sustain collusion in this way fail under either public monitoring, frequent actions or both. Radner (1985 Radner ( , 1986 introduced "review strategies," which punish players for statistical deviations from prescribed behavior. However, since players play pure-hence public-strategies, they remain subject to the basic problems of value-burning. This is epitomized in Radner et al. (1986) , which offers a classic example of a game with unsurmountable inefficiency because of value-burning and despite access to review strategies. Abreu et al. (1991) assume that public signals (such as prices) arrive in blocks of fixed length of time, rather than every period, and exogenously manipulated the block length T . They constructed equilibria that economized on punishment as follows. When the signal arrives every period, public equilibria punish every time the public signal is "bad news." With delay and lumping of the signals, it is possible to avoid punishing every such time and only punish sometimes. Indeed, Abreu et al. (1991) construct equilibria where players are punished only after T "bad news" signals. As Levin (2003 , p. 847) suggested, Fuchs (2007 applied their construction to relational contracting. This approach suffers from two basic problems. First, it breaks down if public signals are not delayed: once a firm knows of at least one "good news" signal the fear of punishment disappears. Second, it is too lenient: incentives break down with frequent actions and imperfect monitoring (for instance, Brownian motion), even with arbitrary delay of exogenous information. See Rahman (2013b) for details. Kandori and Matsushima (1998, motivated by Matsushima, 1995) and Compte (1998) overcame some of these problems by considering games with private monitoring and conditionally independent signals. They replaced exogenous information delay with endogenous delay of other players' reported signals, on which continuation values were allowed to depend. Players monitored and scored others directly through their signals over blocks of time. Relying on conditional independence, the same signal latency is possible as with exogenous delay. This restores collusion as in Abreu et al. (1991) . Of course, though, the approach breaks down completely with public monitoring, which suggests that public monitoring can be a greater challenge to collusion than private monitoring. Additionally, Kandori and Matsushima (1998) considered a less lenient punishment trigger, but still lenient enough to temper value-burning. However, this trigger offers limited success at best with frequent actions, rendering full collusion generally unattainable. Again, see Rahman (2013b) for details.
Obara (2009) and Obara and Rahman (2006) extend Compte (1998) to allow for correlated signals, but fail with frequent actions. Fong et al. (2011) build on the work of Matsushima (2004) and Ely et al. (2005) in a two-player Prisoners' Dilemma with private monitoring, no communication, and a small amount of correlation amongst players' signals. There are several basic problems with their construction which mine overcomes. First, they require "sufficiently private monitoring," which completely eliminates the more challenging case of public signals. Secondly, their construction breaks down with frequent actions, even under private monitoring, since it relies on sufficiently accurate hypothesis testing and this fails with imperfect monitoring in the limit. Lastly, their construction is implicit and does not apply to general games.
Below, I overcome all these challenges by deriving scoring rules and thresholds that obtain virtually full collusion in the frequent actions limit regardless of whether signals are public or private, and using other players' recommendations to make these scores latent. Since recommendations are independent of actual behavior, their purpose is precisely to encrypt a player's score.
Construction and Incentive Properties of Latent Scores
Usually, firms are asked to produce the collusive duopoly output, q d = 1 2 q m , but are occasionally asked to underproduce, q u , and overproduce, q o , for some given output levels q u and q o such that 0 < q u < q d < q o . Every period, the mediator recommends an output profile (q 1 , q 2 ) ∈ {q u , q d , q o } × {q u , q d , q o } with probability µ 12 > 0, where µ dd is close to 1. The rest of µ is chosen such that µ is symmetric (µ 12 = µ 21 ) and-to establish Lemma 3 below-so that, given q 1 ∈ {q u , q d , q o },
To construct firm i's latent score, start with S i0 = 0. For all t ∈ ∆t · {1, . . . , c/∆t }, let S it = S it−∆t ± √ ∆t with probability 1 2 if ∆p t < 0 and 1 2 ± ζ i (q 1t , q 2t ) if ∆p t > 0, where (q 1t , q 2t ) is the mediator's recommendation profile at time t,
ζ 2 is defined symmetrically to ζ 1 and α i (q i ) > 0 is a constant such that 1 2 ± ζ i (q 1 , q 2 ) is a probability for all ∆t > 0 sufficiently small. Intuitively, ζ determines stochastically when price increases raise or lower a firm's score. It tends to raise a firm's score if the other firm was asked to under-or over-produce, and otherwise tends to lower it.
Lemma 3. In equilibrium, every firm i has a driftless score S i , even conditional on i's information. If i ever deviates then S i has a positive drift for all small ∆t > 0.
Proof. Without loss, focus on firm 1. By construction, S 1t has no drift ifp t drops. Otherwise, if firm 1 deviates from q 1 by h andp t rises, S 1t increases with probability
.
In equilibrium, h = 0. Substituting for ζ 1 , it follows that the numerator above equals
That is, S 1 has no drift given firm 1's information, hence unconditionally, too. If h = 0 then, after rearrangement, the numerator equals
A first-order Taylor series expansion around √ ∆t = 0 yields
, ∆P (h|q) = P (q + h) − P (q) and µ 1 = q 2 µ 12 is the marginal probability of q 1 .
I will now use (10) to show that z(h|q 1 ) > 0 if h = 0, therefore S i has positive drift.
Since clearly f (0) = 0 and f is differentiable, I will equivalently show that f (h) > 0 if h > 0, f (h) < 0 if h < 0, and f (0) = 0. Let ρ = 1 + e > 0. Substituting for P (q),
Defineq 1 (h) to satisfỹ
Proof of Claim 1. Let q 1uh = q 1 +q u +h and q 1oh = q 1 +q o +h. By routine calculations,
, so dq 1 /dh > 1 if and only ifq 1 (h|ρ + 1) <q 1 (h|ρ). Moreover,
where the last inequality follows because x ln x is clearly a convex function of x. Since this is true for every ρ, it follows thatq 1 (h|ρ + 1) <q 1 (h|ρ), hence dq 1 /dh > 1.
By construction, (10) implies that f (0) = 0. Therefore, since, by Claim 1, h > 0 implies that
On the other hand, if h < 0 then, again by Claim 1, q 1 + q d + h >q 1 (h|ρ), so (q 1 + q d + h) −ρ <q 1 (h|ρ) −ρ and f (h) < 0. This finally establishes Lemma 3. In the proof of Lemma 3, z(h|q 1 ) was defined to be the drift of S i given i's information, since Pr(∆S it > 0|q 1 , h, ∆p t > 0) ≈ The graph on the left of Figure 4 illustrates Lemma 3 by showing how every deviation increases the drift of i's score S i . As ∆t → 0, S i converges to a Brownian motion with S ic ∼ N (0, c) in equilibrium, so the probability of punishment is approximately 1 − Φ(z √ c) when the punishment cutoff is zc. Many cutoffs give the right incentives; I use the largest drift from any deviation, assuming that a firm produces at least 0:
It is easy to see that 0 < z < ∞.
15 I will now use the cutoff z to find a punishment w that discourages firms from disobeying the mediator. I apply the approach of Rahman (2013a) for general repeated games to this Cournot oligopoly and derive w 15 By Lemma 3, z > 0, z(h|q 1 ) is decreasing in h < 0, so z(h|q 1 ) ≤ z(−q 1 |q 1 ) < ∞ for h ∈ [−q 1 , 0], and z(h|q 1 ) is increasing in h > 0. Now z < ∞ follows because z is bounded, since clearly z(h|q 1 ) converges to
intuitively; see Rahman (2013a) for formal details. To apply this approach, I assume that the magnitude of deviations is bounded below-as I show, the agreement above cannot discourage profitable infinitesimal deviations in this environment.
Definition 3. Let η > 0. A deviation h from q is feasible if |h| ≥ η and h + q ≥ 0.
Last-period deviations are now discouraged (see Figure 5 below). But this argument applies also to previous periods, so by induction every deviation is discouraged.
By Lemma 4, w → 0 as r → 0 for any c > 0, so w is feasible for sufficiently patient firms. Let R = (q 1 ,q 2 ) q 1 P (q 1 + q 2 )µ 12 be a firm's expected revenue when everyone follows the mediator. Using (12), lifetime equilibrium payoffs u are given by Given a smooth set W of payoff profiles as in Figure 5 above, Rahman (2013a) uses punishments and rewards to self-decompose W in "block-public" communication equilibrium. To apply this result and complete the equilibrium construction above, I verify below a necessary bound on deviation gains. I also offer general sufficient conditions on an arbitrary demand curve P for such a Folk Theorem.
As in the previous section, firms can dispense with the mediator by communicating their intentions directly, although this time with a delay of c instead of just ∆t. Notice also that this construction generalizes easily to other environments, such as ones with private monitoring and information. For instance, private monitoring is arguably easier because firms can use each other's private observations to keep scores secret, which is the key to recycling incentives that facilitates collusion.
Folk Theorem with Bounded Deviation Gains
Rahman (2013a, Theorem 2) establishes a Folk Theorem for repeated games with frequent actions that satisfy a conditional identifiability condition and a bound on deviation gains. The former requirement is equivalent to the existence of a score that has no drift after obeying the mediator but whose drift increases with every deviation. Since such a score exists, the demand curve P (q) = q −e satisfies conditional identifiability. For some demand curves, such as a linear one, this condition fails. By definition, P exhibits conditional identifiability if P (·|q) ∈ conv{P (·|q + h) : q + h ≥ 0} + L 1 ∀q ≥ 0,
where P (x|q) = P (q + x) and L 1 = {λ1 : λ ∈ R} is the line generated by the constant function. It is easy to see that both P (q) = α − βq and P (q) = e −γq fail conditional identifiability, but many other demand curves satisfy it.
Write monopoly profit as R m = q m [q 
When σ 1 ≈ 0.489, (15) holds. By continuity, it still holds near e = 1/2.
Intuitively, (14) means that a firm is better off with its share of monopoly rents than best-responding to the other firm monopolizing the market. I use this assumption as follows. Broadly, the Folk Theorem in Rahman (2013a) gives individual punishments and rewards to firms independently of each other, in contrast with Fudenberg et al. (1994) , say, who correlate continuation values across firms to avoid value-burning.
As a result, a firm that is rewarded must be compensated for every deviation with its reward. Of course, any such deviation ought to lower the likelihood of reward, yet in equilibrium the expected reward must still compensate for every deviation. Hence, the feasible lifetime average payoff for a firm being motivated to produce a temporarily disadvantageous amount with rewards must accommodate at least the best deviation from its temporary disadvantage. Punishments, on the other hand, can be rare in equilibrium as long as deviations increase the chance of punishments. This argument originates in Compte (1998) in a discrete game with private monitoring. For the monopoly profit line to be approachable for patient players, at least part of it must remain after restricting reward-driven payoffs to compensate every deviation. This is what (14) Formally, let W be a smooth set of payoff profiles in the interior of U n , the set of feasible payoffs in excess of the static Nash equilibrium (q n , q n ), where U n = {R(q 1 , q 2 ) ≥ R(q n , q n ) : (q 1 , q 2 ) ≥ 0}
and R(q 1 , q 2 ) = (q 1 , q 2 )[(q 1 +q 2 ) −e −γ] is the profit profile when firms produce (q 1 , q 2 ).
For W to be a subset of equilibrium payoffs, it must be locally self-decomposable with continuation values at the end of a given block of length c. Just as with secret monitoring, local self-decomposability is necessary at each point of ∂W . Consider a point whose outward normal vector gives positive weight to one firm and negative weight to the other, as in the bottom right-hand corner of Figure 5 above. At this point, the firm with negative weight must be given incentives with rewards, therefore its expected continuation value must increase by at least its best deviation gains, as was argued in the previous paragraph.
